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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Slut, you think I won’t choke no whore? ‘Til the vocal chords don’t
work in her throat no more?”1 These are lyrics to Eminem’s2 song “Kill Me.”3
In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether a
person can be convicted for posting rap lyrics like these on social media.4 That
case involved Anthony Douglas Elonis, a man who wrote rap lyrics and posted
them on his Facebook5 page.6 Elonis went by the pseudonym “Tone Dougie”
on Facebook.7 His rap lyrics were often violent, and many who viewed those

*

J.D. Candidate, 2017, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. in Political Science and
B.S. in Psychology, 2012, Loyola University Chicago. I would like to thank my family and
friends for their support and encouragement throughout this process. I especially want to
thank my mother, Virginia Geha, for being my number one supporter and pushing me to
achieve my goals. I would also like to thank Professor Timothy O’Neill for suggesting this
topic and helping me get started on my research.
1. EMINEM, Kill Me, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Interscope Records 2000).
2. Eminem is a best-selling American rapper who is considered one of the greatest of
all time. He has produced seven rap CDs and continues to be popular after many years in
the music industry. Eminem, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eminem (last visited
Mar. 29, 2017).
3. Eminem, supra note 1.
4. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
5. Facebook is a social networking website. Users can create a personal Facebook page
or a page for their brand or corporation. It is a place to connect with others and share stories.
About Facebook, FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com/help/174987089221178 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2016).
6. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004-05.
7. Id. at 2005.
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lyrics perceived them to be threatening. 8 A grand jury indicted Elonis for
threatening his wife, coworkers, police officers, a sheriff’s department, a
kindergarten class, and an FBI agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(“875(c)”).9 Elonis challenged the conviction and argued that his posts were
protected under the First Amendment right to free speech.10
One of Elonis’s Facebook posts included a photo of him holding a fake
knife to his coworker’s neck at a work-related Halloween event with the
caption “I wish.”11 His boss saw the picture and subsequently fired him. 12
After his termination, he posted a message on Facebook suggesting that he
was a mad man and insinuated that the work facility was not safe from him. 13
Elonis also made several remarks about his wife, whom he was divorcing. 14
He posted a message stating that it is illegal to say he wants to kill his wife but
not illegal to talk about that fact.15 His wife felt threatened by the post, and the
court granted a restraining order against him. 16 Upon learning about the order,
Elonis posted a Facebook status update 17 stating that the order was not “thick
enough to stop a bullet.”18 He also insinuated that he had “enough explosives
to take care of the State Police and Sheriff’s Department.” 19 In another status
update, Elonis posted a comment about wanting to shoot up a kindergarten
class.20 The FBI began monitoring his Facebook page after learning about his
8. Id.
9. United States v. Elonis, No. 11-13, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121401, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 20, 2011); Interstate Communications, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). The statute provides:
(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Id.
10. Elonis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121401, at *3.
11. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
12. Id.
13. Id. In that post, Elonis said, “Y’all think it’s too dark and foggy to secure your
facility from a man as mad as me?” Id.
14. Id. at 2005-06.
15. Id. In this message, Elonis said, “Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want
to kill my wife?” Id. He also said “it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just
telling you that it’s illegal for me to say [that] . . . But not illegal to say with a mortar
launcher.” Id. In that post, he suggested that someone should kill his wife and went on to
describe her house in detail. Id. at 2006. He even included an illustrated diagram of the
house. Id. Elonis got the idea for this post from a comedian’s skit. Id. He posted the link to
that skit and said, “Art is about pushing limits. I’m willing to go to jail for my Constitutional
rights. Are you?” Id. Elonis basically took that skit word for word swapping out “the
President” for “my wife.” Id; see Whitest Kids U’ Know, It’s Illegal to Say . . .,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEQOvy GbBtY (explaining how it is illegal to talk about
killing the president, but not illegal to talk about the illegality of it.).
16. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2013). Elonis’s wife testified
that she was scared for her own life and the lives of her children and family. Id. She also
said she felt “like [she] was being stalked.” Id.
17. A status update is a feature on Facebook that allows users to post messages and
share content on their profiles. What is a Facebook Status?, TECHOPEDIA www.techopedia
.com/definition/15442/facebook-status (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
18. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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troubling posts.21 Several FBI agents visited his house, and afterward, he made
a post about one of them.22 A grand jury indicted him for transmitting threats
in violation of 875(c).23 Elonis challenged the jury instruction, which stated
that he should be convicted if a reasonable person would perceive his posts as
threats.24 He claimed that writing the lyrics was therapeutic, and he did not do
it with the intent to threaten. 25 He challenged the jury instruction both at the
district court level and at the court of appeals. 26 Both courts disagreed with his
contention that a jury must prove he intended his posts as threats. 27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari28 and reversed Elonis’s
conviction.29 It stated that while the statute does not specify a mental state or
mens rea,30 a guilty mind is still a requirement for a criminal conviction. 31
However, the Court did not specify the mens rea that would suffice; it found
negligence insufficient; nevertheless, the Court refused to decide whether
recklessness would be adequate.32 The Court then remanded the case to the
trial court to address whether Elonis had the requisite mental state to be
convicted under the statute.33 In his partial dissent, Justice Samuel Alito
agreed with the reversal of Elonis’s conviction; however, he recommended the
Court resolve the recklessness issue to offer clarity to the lower courts. 34
The government has an interest in ensuring that “[i]nternet
communications and all other means of communication via the mail or in
interstate commerce are free of threatening messages.” 35 However, Elonis
created some challenges for lower courts when determining the proper mens
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2006-07. In that post, he said “[t]ook all the strength I had not to turn the b****
ghost, [p]ull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat, [l]eave her bleedin’ from her
jugular in the arms of her partner.” Id. He also suggested that when the agent visited him,
he was wearing a bomb. Id.
23. Elonis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121401, at *2.
24. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
25. Id.
26. Id. Elonis wanted the jury instruction to say, “the government must prove that he
intended to communicate a true threat.” Id.
27. Id.
28. Certiorari literally means “to be more fully informed.” BRYAN A. GARNER,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: POCKET EDITION 104 (4th ed. 2011). Certiorari is a writ by an
appellate court asking a lower court to deliver the case record for the appellate court to
review. Id.
29. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008.
30. “Mens rea” refers to a Latin phrase meaning guilty mind. Mens Rea, LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea.
31. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009.
32. Id. at 2013. The Court said that it was capable of deciding whether recklessness is a
proper mens rea for communicating online threats; however, it declined to make a judgment
because neither party briefed or argued the issue. Id. “We may be ‘capable of deciding the
recklessness issue,’ but following our usual practice of awaiting a decision below and
hearing from the parties would help ensure that we decide it correctly.” Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2013-14 (Alito, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
35. Zane D. Memeger, Confronting First Amendement Challenges in Internet Stalking
and Threat Cases, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: OFFICES OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS (July 20, 2015), www.justice.gov/usao/priority- areas/cyber-crime/int
ernet-stalking.
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rea to criminalize a Facebook threat under 875(c).36 The Supreme Court left
the question of whether recklessness is enough to convict under the statute
unresolved in its Elonis opinion.37
This comment analyzes 875(c) and the absence of a required mental
state. Part II of this comment explores the First Amendment’s exception to
true threats and how it impacts 875(c). Part II also explores the mens rea
requirement in criminal cases and how lower courts have decided similar
cases. Part III analyzes the different arguments as to what the required mental
state should be. Part IV proposes why 875(c) should require specific intent for
a conviction and underscores the need for a national campaign to educate
internet users about the consequences of what they post online. Finally, Part
V concludes and reiterates the need for a heightened mens rea and why more
should be done to educate online users about the dangers of posting online.

II.

BACKGROUND

A. The First Amendment’s Exception on True Threats
In Elonis, Anthony Elonis challenged his 875(c) conviction stating that
his posts were protected by the First Amendment right to free speech. 38 The
First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 39 The
government cannot prohibit individuals from speaking, even when they
express unpopular or controversial opinions. 40 The Supreme Court has
stressed that the First Amendment right to free speech exists to allow for the
“free trade in ideas,” even if most people disagree with those ideas or
opinions.41 However, not all speech is protected equally; speech intended to
incite lawless action42 and fighting words43 may be punishable.44 This type of
speech is considered to be a “limited class[ ] of speech” because it lacks value
and fails to contribute to the “exposition of ideas.”45

36. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
37. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
38. Elonis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121401, at *3.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (holding that a ban on flag burning is
an impermissible prohibition on free speech).
41. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (finding that punishment for cross
burning with intent to intimidate was not in violation of the First Amendment); see also
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (holding that political hyperbole is not a true
threat).
42. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (finding that the government
can punish a speaker for incitement if it results in “imminent lawless action”).
43. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting
words as words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace”).
44. Black, 538 U.S. at 358.
45. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
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The government may also punish “true threats.” 46 The Supreme Court
defined “true threats” as statements a speaker makes which express “intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”47 As long as the speaker intends to make a threat, he or she can
be punished for making a true threat.48 The reason behind the true threat
prohibition is to protect people from “the fear of violence,” the disruption that
fear creates, and the possible fulfillment of that threat. 49 Speech may be
punishable when it crosses the line and becomes threatening.50
Elonis questioned whether the First Amendment protected violent “rap
lyrics” on Facebook or whether the true threats doctrine prohibited them. 51
However, that question remains unanswered.52 The Supreme Court declined
to address that issue in its opinion;53 instead, it opted to evaluate 875(c) and
whether Elonis had the proper mental state to be convicted under the statute. 54
In doing so, the Court recognized that in order to convict under the statute, a
person must have a “guilty mind” or a subjective intent to threaten. 55

46. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 359-60.
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id.
51. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004.
52. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address this issue in Elonis, but it
declined to do so. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001. Anthony Elonis was a fan of Eminem. Id. at
2007. Elonis testified that his lyrics were an emulation of Eminem’s lyrics, in which he
fantasized about killing his ex-wife. Id. In Eminem’s song “Kim,” he raps about his wife
cheating on him. EMINEM, Kim, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Interscope Records
2000). The lyrics portray a fictional argument he is having with her and at the end of the
song, he chokes her to death. Id. Like several other rap songs, Eminem’s songs often make
references to violence. Brief for the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap
Music Scholars (Professors Erik Nielson and Charis E. Kubrin) as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13
983_pet_amcu_mbbfap.authcheckdam.pdf. (hereinafter “Brechner Amicus Brief”).
While Eminem’s lyrics may seem threatening, they are not to be taken literally, as he
cautions in his song “Sing for the Moment.” EMINEM, Sing for the Moment, on THE EMINEM
SHOW (Aftermath 2002). In that song, he sings, “[i]t’s all political, if my music is literal,
and I’m a criminal, how the f*** could I raise a little girl, I couldn’t, I wouldn’t be fit to . .
. .” Id.
The Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap Music Scholars wrote an
amicus brief in support of Anthony Elonis. In that brief, they discuss how rap music often
includes wordplay in which insults may be compliments and threats can be jokes. Brechner
Amicus Brief at 3. What a rapper means and what he intends may be completely different.
Id. That is because rap music cherishes ambiguity. Id. Like other forms of poetry, rap music
often contains symbolism and metaphors. Id. Since rap music is often ambiguous, it is
difficult to interpret the meaning of the lyrics. Id.; see Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(“one man's vulgarity is another's lyric”).
53. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001. Justice Thomas briefly discussed the issue in his dissent.
Id. at 2019 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
54. Id. at 2009.
55. Id. at 2003.
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B. Objective versus Subjective Intent
Prior to Elonis, there was a circuit split concerning the true threats
doctrine’s requirement on intent. 56 Subjective intent means the defendant
specifically intends to threaten. 57 Specific intent requires that the defendant
knows the result of his actions and desires that result. 58 On the other hand,
objective intent looks to whether a reasonable person would perceive the
defendant’s statement as a threat.59 Nine circuit courts have found that an
objective standard is enough to convict,60 while only two circuits have held
that a defendant must be found to have a subjective intent to threaten.61
In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit adopted the Fulmer test.62 It
applied the standard of whether the defendant could reasonably foresee that
others would perceive his statement as a threat. 63 The First Circuit explained
that the objective standard protects a speaker from being punished for making
innocent comments a sensitive listener perceives as a threat. 64 Additionally, it
protects the listener from statements “reasonably interpreted as threats” even
when the speaker has no subjective intent.65

56. Id. at 2018. (Thomas, J. dissenting).
57. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 634 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating the conviction
of a man who threatened potential buyers of his former girlfriend’s property).
58. United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding defendant’s
guilty plea for gambling because he had the requisite specific intent).
59. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that
expulsion of a student was unreasonable because his brother accidentally brought his violent
drawing to school).
60. See United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6 (lst Cir. 2003) (maintaining the
conviction of a man who threatened a couple for whom he facilitated an adoption); see
United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding the conviction of a man who
made threatening calls to his former girlfriend and her son); see United States v. Elonis, 730
F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2013), cert granted (maintaining Elonis’s conviction under an objective
intent standard); see United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming
conviction of a man who threatened and intimidated several people); see United States v.
Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479-480 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 59 (2013) (sustaining
the conviction of a man who posted a YouTube video in which he threatening to kill the
judge assigned to his child custody case); see United States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825, 828
(7th Cir. 2005) (upholding defendants conviction for threatening to blow up the Union office
that represented him in several phone calls); see United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 33032 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107 (2012) (affirming conviction of defendant
who mailed threatening letters to several different people under an objective standard); see
United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 988 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the conviction of a
man who sent an anonymous email threatening to shoot up a school to stand).
61. See Cassel, 408 F.3d at 634; see also Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014)
(reversing the conviction of defendant and remanding the case to the jury to find whether
the defendant had subjective intent to threaten in his email).
62. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997). The Fulmer test
provides that “whether he should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered
would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made.” Id.
63. Whiffen, 121 F.3d at 21.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit stressed the defendant’s intent does not matter; instead,
what matters is how a reasonable observer would interpret the statements. 66
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has determined that guilt is dependent solely on
whether a person viewing the statements reasonably perceives them as
threats.67 In Elonis, the Third Circuit stressed that requiring subjective intent
fails to protect individuals who see violent posts from fear.68 According to the
Third Circuit, punishing those who post threats online is acceptable because it
protects those who would fear those posts. 69 Additionally, because these
threats “contribute nothing to public discourse,” they do not receive First
Amendment protection; and any objective showing of intent may be sufficient
to convict a speaker.70 While these circuit courts have nuances in their
standards, all of the tests highlight the importance of objective intent. 71
The Ninth72 and Tenth73 Circuits were the only circuit courts to hold the
minority view that subjective intent is required to convict someone for making
threats.74 The Ninth Circuit construed the true threats doctrine to require an
intent to threaten.75 It reasoned that intent separates “protected expression
from unprotected criminal behavior.” 76 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit required
more than simply communicating a threat.77 It required that the speaker intend
for the listener to believe he or she desires to carry out the threat. 78 The Court
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, and stressed,
“[w]hen the Court says that the speaker must mean to communicate a serious
expression of an intent, it is requiring more than a purpose to communicate
just the threatening words. It is requiring that the speaker want the recipient to
believe that the speaker intends to act violently.” 79 The Supreme Court
resolved the circuit split in the context of 875(c) and held that courts must
consider the defendant’s mental state when determining guilt under the
statute.80

66. Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478.
67. Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828.
68. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 at 330.
69. Id.
70. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 984.
71. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d at 16; Sovie, 122 F.3d at 125; Elonis, 730 F.3d at 332; White,
670 F.3d at 507; Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 479-80; Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828; Mabie, 663 F.3d at
330-32; Martinez, 736 F.3d at 988.
72. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 622.
73. Heineman, 767 F.3d at 970.
74. The Supreme Courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont have all found
that a subjective standard is required in order to convict a person for making a threat. See
O’Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547, 557 (Mass. 2012); State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491,
515 (R.I. 2004); State v. Miles, 15 A.3d 596, 599 (Vt. 2011).
75. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 634.
76. Id. at 632.
77. Heineman, 767 F.3d at 978.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 360) (internal citations omitted).
80. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
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C. Mens Rea Requirement When the Legislature is Silent
While the Supreme Court held that a defendant must have subjective
intent to threaten under 875(c), it did not say which mens rea standard would
be enough to convict.81 The Supreme Court held that in addition to committing
a crime, a culpable mens rea is required to convict a person under a criminal
statute.82 The Court stressed that Congress’s silence does not eliminate the
mens rea requirement.83 Moreover, “Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence”
requires this rule; it is not the exception.84 In order to dispense with the mens
rea requirement, Congress must indicate it expressly or impliedly intends to
do so.85 The idea that someone must intend to violate a law is “universal and
persistent in mature systems of law.”86
Criminal law recognizes four culpable mental states: purposefully (or
intentionally), knowingly, recklessness, and negligence. 87 These mental states
are hierarchical, with purposefully being the most culpable and negligence
being the least culpable.88 A person acts “purposefully” if he acts with a
“conscious desire” to achieve a result.89 Whereas a person acts “knowingly”
if he is sure that a particular result will follow.90 On the other hand,
recklessness requires a conscious disregard of “a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” 91 The
disregard must be a gross deviation from a law-abiding person’s standard of
care.92 Finally, a person is negligent when he “should be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct.”93 The risk “must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s
failure to perceive it” grossly deviates from a reasonable person’s standard of
care.94
The Supreme Court prefers mens rea requirements that give individuals
“breathing room” to speak without fear of “accidentally incur[ring]

81. Id.
82. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (finding that in order to convict
a defendant, the defendant must “know the facts that make his conduct fit the description of
the offense”). Staples introduced strict liability as offenses with no mens rea requirement.
Id. at 607. This decision gave Congress the authority to enact legislation with no mens rea
requirement. Id. However, Congress must expressly or impliedly indicate that no mens rea
is required. Id.
83. Id.
84. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
85. Staples, 511 U.S. at 600.
86. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (finding that the omission of
intent from a crime statute should not be construed to require no intent).
87. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (reversing the appellate court’s
jury instruction to exclude evidence of the jail conditions that pushed them to escape).
88. Id.
89. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (reversing
defendants antitrust violations because the judge’s actions were reversible error).
90. Id.
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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liability.”95 In his concurring opinion in Rogers v. United States, Justice
Marshall cautioned against adopting negligence as the proper mens rea in
statutes regulating speech.96 He noted that earlier Supreme Court decisions
were reluctant to find negligence to be sufficient in criminal statutes where the
legislature has been silent.97 In Elonis, the Supreme Court cited this opinion
and stressed that negligence was not enough to convict a person for violating
875(c).98 The Court opined that the fact-finder must consider the defendant’s
mens rea when determining federal criminal liability. 99 However, it did not
determine the required mens rea for violations of 875(c) and whether
recklessness would suffice. 100

D. Determining Intent on Social Media
Depending on the mens rea standard to apply, it is necessary for the factfinder to consider the context of the post. This may be difficult to do. 101 A
problem that arises with online postings is the potential for misinterpreting a
speaker’s intent.102 For example, if a person posts something sarcastic, a reader
may not be able to tell whether the speaker intended the post to be literal. Due
to the lack of non-verbal communication, individuals easily misinterpret
online speech.103 The speaker knows what he intends to say, but his intent may
not be obvious to the person on the other side of the conversation. 104
Sometimes online users use “emojis” or “emoticons” to convey their
message.105 An emoji is a picture that can be anything from a smiley face to a
“whimsical ghost.”106 An emoticon by contrast is “a typographic display of a
facial representation, used to convey emotion in a text only medium.”107
However, emojis and emoticons are often ambiguous themselves. 108 Internet

95. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (holding that there is no
general exception to free speech that allows punishment for any false statements).
96. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Justin Kruger et al., Egocentrism Over E-Mail: Can We Communicate as Well as
We Think?, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 925, 926 (2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. It is difficult to tell whether a person is being “sarcastic or serious, disrespectful
or deferential, and sanguine or somber.” Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Alex Hern, Don't know the difference between emoji and emoticons? Let me
explain, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2015), www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/06/di
fference-between-emoji-and-emoticons-explained.
107. Id.
108. Kruger, supra note 101; Eyder Peralta, Lost In Translation: Study Finds
Interpretation Of Emojis Can Vary Widely, WBEZ (Apr. 12, 2016), www.wbez.org/shows/
npr/lost-in-translation-study-finds-interpretation-of-emojis-can-vary-widely/d2dc5c017838-4e37-bddb9b09aed36b55. This article discussed a study which found that people have
different views on the meaning of emojis. Id. For instance, some people may believe an
emoji is positive and others may believe that same emoji is negative. Id.
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usage has taken away context for both the speaker and the reader, making it
difficult to understand a speaker’s actual intent.109
The Internet also allows people to say things they would not ordinarily
say in a face-to-face conversation.110 It is easier to be anonymous online so
individuals believe they can say anything without fear of consequences. 111
This too poses challenges for true threats as individuals may post comments
that others perceive as threats. While the person posting the comment does not
consider it to be a threat, others viewing the post may.

E. The Application of 875(c) Beyond Elonis
Another problem with online postings is that many online users do not
think about the content that are posting online and how others may perceive
it. This is particularly true among teenagers. 112 One study found that 8 out of
10 teenagers do not think twice before they post something online.113 This fact
was apparent when Justin Carter, a 19-year-old, was arrested and went to jail
for posting a sarcastic comment on his Facebook page.114 He was on Facebook
arguing with others about a video game. 115 After someone called him insane,
he responded by saying, “Oh yeah, I'm real messed up in the head. I'm going
to go shoot up a school full of kids and eat their still-beating hearts.”116 He
said that this post was sarcastic, however, the police arrested him and jailed
him for five months.117 Likewise, some teenagers also engage in
cyberbullying.118 This is particularly true among the Millennial generation, 119
109. Caleb Mason, Framing Context, Anonymous Internet Speech, and Intent: New
Uncertainty About the Constitutional Test for True Threats, 41 SW. L. REV., 43, 73 (2012).
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Youth IGF Project – Childnet International, Global Perspectives on
Online Anonymity: Age trends in the use of anonymity online and its impact on human
behaviour and freedom of expression (Oct. 2013), www.youthigfproject.com/uploads/8/5/3
/6/8536818/global_perspectives_on_onli ne_anonymity.pdf (surveying children ages 13
and up about their experiences speaking anonymously online).
112. Multi-Country Ask.fm, As Digital and Offline Lives Merge, 8 Out of 10 US Teens
Post to Social Media Without a Second Thought, PR NEWSWIRE (2015), www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/as-digital-and-offline-lives-merge-8-out-of-10-us-teens-post-to-socialmedia-without-a-second-thought-300134097.html.
113. Id.
114. Doug Gross, Teen in Jail for Months Over ‘Sarcastic’ Facebook Threat, CNN (July
3, 2013), www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/tech/social-media/facebook-threat-carter/.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brandon Griggs, Teen jailed for Facebook 'joke' is released, CNN (July 13, 2013),
www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/tech/social-media/facebook-jailed-teen/.
118. Ellen Kraft, An exploratory study of the Cyberbullying and Cyberstalking
experiences and factors related to victimization of students at a public liberal Arts College,
www.researchgate.net/profile/Ellen_Kraft/publication/220256917_An_Exploratory
_Study_of_the_Cyberbullying_and_Cyberstalking_Experiences_and_Factors_Related_to_
Victimization_of_Students_at_a_Public_Liberal_Arts_College/links/555b64f608aec5ac2
2323c51.pdf (Oct. 2010). Cyberbullying refers to when an individual uses the Internet to
engage in “deliberate, repeated and hostile behavior” intended to harm others. Id. at 75.
119. Millenials are the generation of people who were born between 1980 and 2000.
Sam Tanenhaus, Generation Nice: The Millennials Are Generation Nice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
15, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/fashion/coach-house-opens-on-fifth-avenu
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who grew up using the Internet.120 The Internet is a major part of their lives,
and they use it on a regular basis.121 This is problematic because many of these
teenagers do not understand the consequences of what they post online and
how their posts can affect others.122
As the Court in Elonis declined to rule on the required mens rea for
posting an online threat in violation of 875(c), it left the door open to obscurity.
Problems arise due to the difficulty in determining whether an online posting
is actually a threat. Absent context and other non-verbal communication cues
that individuals observe in a face-to-face conversation, misinterpretation is
common. Additionally, because online users are unaware that their posts may
be perceived in a threatening manner, it is important to establish clearer mens
rea guidelines. The next section analyzes the different mens rea requirements
and argues why recklessness should not be enough to convict.

III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court held that negligence is not enough to convict under
875(c), but it did not say whether recklessness, knowledge or intent should be
the proper standard. In his partial dissent, Justice Alito disagreed with the
majority’s silence as to the proper mens rea to convict a person under
875(c).123 He pointed out that the majority decision will not offer clarity for
lower courts.124 Lower courts and juries must decide cases and apply their own
standard.125 If recklessness is the proper standard, and a district court instructs
the jury that a more culpable mens rea is required, those guilty of
communicating threats could be let off the hook. 126 On the other hand, Justice
Thomas suggested in his dissent that negligence or “general intent” was
enough to convict.127 What should the proper standard be: general intent,
specific intent, or recklessness? This section will first evaluate the arguments
for and against general intent. Second, it will analyze the recklessness
standard. Third, it will explore the specific intent standard and explain why
specific intent should be the appropriate standard. Finally, it will explore how
to determine context in online postings.

e.html?ribbon-ad-idx=3&rref=fashion&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Fashion
%20%26%20Style&action=click&region=FixedRight&pgtype=article.
120. Kraft, supra note 118, at 74.
121. Id.
122. Multi-Country Ask.fm, supra note 112.
123. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013-14 (Alito, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 2014.
125. Id. Justice Alito contends that the possibility for wrongful conviction may increase
if a district court instructs the jury on a less culpable mens rea if the proper standard is a
more culpable one. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2021.
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A. General Intent
General intent protects a defendant from being convicted based on
certain facts he does not perceive. 128 Accordingly, the defendant must know
that he is committing the prohibited act.129 Justice Thomas argued that
Congress should have included a heightened mens rea if it intended one; in
this instance, Congress remained silent on this issue. 130 He discounted the
majority’s opinion, and argued that allowing general intent would not punish
innocent conduct.131 Justice Thomas stressed that it is acceptable to punish an
individual for posting a threat online. 132 He reasoned that an individual likely
knows the true meaning of his post and how others can perceive it. 133
Like Justice Thomas, the Anti-Defamation League, an organization
dedicated to combatting anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination, 134
argued in its amicus brief135 that an objective standard allows Courts to
evaluate the complete circumstances of the threat and consider all the
evidence.136 The Anti-Defamation League argued that a jury should determine
whether the speech crosses the line from protected speech to true threat
because of the reasonable fear and disruption that it creates. 137 The League
argued that a stricter standard is improper because speakers will be under little
pressure to behave within social norms.138 Online threats can cause fear, waste
a police department’s time and resources and place people in danger. 139

128. Id. (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994); Staples,
511 U.S. at 614-15; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270-71). Justice Thomas cites to Morissette,
where the Supreme Court held that a person is guilty of theft when he knowingly takes the
property of another. Likewise, in X-Citement, the Court found that knowledge was enough
to convict a person of transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing child
pornography. However, these cases are distinguishable from Elonis. Neither case involves
online speech, nor do those cases discuss speech at all.
129. Id.
130. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2021-22 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Brief for the Anti-Defamation League as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-983_resp_amcu_adl.auth4c
heckdam.pdf at *1-2.
135. An amicus brief or amicus curiae is a brief written by a non-party to the suit who
has an interest in the outcome of the case. Amicus Curiae, LEGAL INFORMATION INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/amicus_curiae (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). Amicus curiae is a
Latin phrase that literally translates to “friend of the court.” Id.
136. Brief for the Anti-Defamation League, supra note 134, at *4. This brief argues why
the objective standard should be applied. Id. The Anti-Defamation League indicates that the
Internet has created a whole new arena for people to harass and intimidate others with
relative ease. Id. at 8. It argues that “[a]n attacker can make contact with a specific target,
virtually anywhere, without ever having to know his or her physical location.” Id. The
message is immediately received by the target. Id. The attacker does not even need to know
the location of his target. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 9-10.
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Similarly, the National Network to End Domestic Violence expressed
concern that domestic violence perpetrators are increasingly using social
media as a tool.140 According to the National Network to End Domestic
Violence, social medial allows these perpetrators the opportunity to harass
their victims after they have managed to escape the abuse.141 The National
Network to End Domestic Violence argued that an objective threat will cause
fear in a victim of domestic abuse regardless of the perpetrator’s intent. 142 It
also stressed that the speaker’s intent is not often different from the objective
interpretation of the speech.143
On the other hand, the majority opinion argues that general intent should
not be enough because the Court is concerned about punishing innocent
conduct.144 The Court stressed that when the legislature is silent as to the mens
rea, it reads in a mens rea that separates criminal conduct from innocent
conduct.145 A general intent standard would be detrimental because an
individual could potentially be punished for innocent conduct.146 The Court
emphasized that knowingly transmitting a communication is not criminal;
however, the mens rea requirement must take the fact that the speaker
communicated a threat into account.147 In its amicus brief, the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) points out that in some instances intent will be easy
to determine.148 However, in other cases, particularly in online contexts, it will
be more difficult.149 The ACLU emphasizes that an objective standard
encroaches too far on First Amendment protected speech.150 Moreover, people
holding unpopular opinions will have an increased risk of criminal
prosecution.151 The objective standard allows individuals to be convicted for
“negligently making a threatening statement,” which may chill political
speech and violate the First Amendment.152
In United States v. Martinez, the Eleventh Circuit overturned a
conviction based on the Elonis decision.153 Martinez involved a woman who
140. Brief for The National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13
-983_resp_amcu_nnedv-etal.authcheckdam.pdf, at *2. This brief discusses several victims
of domestic violence who have been harassed even after leaving their partner. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010.
145. Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
146. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010.
147. Id.
148. Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), www.americanba
r.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-9
83_pet_amcu_aclu-etal.authcheckdam.pdf, at *18.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19. (citing White, 670 F.3d 498, 525 (4th Cir. 2012)) (opinion of Floyd, J.)
(explaining that a reasonable person is more likely to feel threatened by “violent and extreme
rhetoric” even if the speaker did not intend to threaten).
152. Id.
153. United States v. Martinez, 800 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015).
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sent a letter to a congressional candidate applauding that candidate’s speech
on gun rights.154 In that letter, she suggested that she was planning to do
“something big” at a government building.155 She also said that she was going
to teach government officials about the Second Amendment’s meaning. 156 A
jury convicted her under a general intent standard.157 While it was unclear
what she intended to do because her letter was ambiguous, under this standard,
if a reasonable person perceived her comment to be a threat, a jury would
convict her.158 The jury found that the circumstances satisfied the general
intent standard.159 Martinez could have meant that she was going to visit a
school or post office and discuss gun rights in an innocent way. This is
precisely the kind of speech that the First Amendment protects. Under a
general intent standard, a jury could convict her regardless of what she thought
or intended. The law would be punishing an individual for exercising a right
guaranteed by the First Amendment. For these reasons, a general intent
standard is improper.

B. Recklessness
In his partial dissent, Justice Alito suggested that recklessness was
enough because our criminal laws justify it. 160 He distinguishes negligence
from recklessness, in that negligence requires that the defendant should have
been “aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.”161 On the other hand,
recklessness exists when an individual knows the risks of his conduct and
disregards those risks.162 The negligence standard requires that the defendant
lack awareness of a risk.163 Whereas, recklessness requires that the defendant
know the risks of his conduct and ignores those risks.164 Justice Alito stressed
that in the mental state hierarchy, once an individual’s actions are more than
negligent, a more culpable mens rea is indefensible.165 He argued a person
recklessly conveying a threat is not careless; that individual is aware that
others may view his comments as threats, but still posts them anyway. 166
However, this argument is unavailing because negligence and recklessness are
not all that different. Punishing individuals for recklessly conveying an online
threat could punish them for posting innocent comments the First Amendment

154. United States v. Martinez, No. 10-60332, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29393 (S.D. Fla.
2011).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Martinez, 800 F.3d at 1295.
158. Martinez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29393.
159. Id.
160. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. (citing ALI Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d), pg. 226 (1985)).
162. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
164. Id.
165. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Id.
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protects.167 Moreover, the cases Justice Alito cites in support of his argument
involves public figures unlike Elonis.168
The difference between negligence and recklessness is the awareness of
a risk.169 Negligence involves an absence of the awareness of a risk, whereas
recklessness involves a “reckless disregard” of a risk. 170 In Elonis, the majority
stressed that negligence was not enough because the defendant must have
some awareness of wrongdoing, which he denied having. 171 The Court noted
that Elonis’s thoughts matter.172
Under recklessness, if Elonis were aware that others may find his
statements to be threatening, and he still made the statements, then a jury
would find he is criminally liable, regardless of whether he intended the posts
as threats.173 The recklessness standard, like the general intent standard,
encompasses too broad a scope. It has the potential for crossing the line from
permissibly punishing an actual threat to impermissibly punishing innocent
speech. This standard could punish a person for posting a joke online because
it is difficult to interpret the defendant’s state of mind when reading the post.
For these reasons, recklessness should not be enough to prosecute an online
threat.
Although it is true that recklessness can punish guilty comments, it has
the potential to cross the line and punish innocent comments. This is
problematic because it encroaches on individuals’ rights to free speech and
runs afoul of the First Amendment. The law may punish individuals for
communicating true threats; however, the standard for true threats requires
specific intent.174

C. Specific Intent
Under a specific intent standard, a jury would have to find that an
individual had a specific intent to threaten.175 Elonis argued that he was merely

167. This would not allow “breathing room” for speech protected by the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has drawn a line between protected speech and
unprotected speech. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, And The Chilling Effect, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1633 (Apr. 2013) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964)). That area of free speech is called the “breathing space.” Id. The government
may not “chill” or prohibit this speech. Id. Applying recklessness to online threats cases
would potentially prohibit speech that falls within the “breathing space.”
168. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015. Justice Alito cites Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (1964)
(finding that recklessness is sufficient to prove liability for libeling a public figure in a civil
suit) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (finding that the recklessness is
sufficient to criminally convict a person for defaming a public figure).
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
170. Id.
171. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2007.
174. Id. at 2007; Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. Juries may convict individuals for
communicating true threats if they can prove that the individuals intended to communicate
threats. Id. The jury need not prove that the defendant intended to act on the threat. Id.
175. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
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posting rap lyrics on his Facebook page.176 The Supreme Court has continually
held that the First Amendment protects musical expression as a form of artistic
expression.177 Not only is musical expression protected under the First
Amendment, so too are comedy and satire, political hyperbole and “trash
talk.”178
Social media websites allow users to limit the control of who can see
their online posts.179 The intended audience may correctly interpret what the
speaker is saying, in a different way than an objective reasonable person may
interpret the statements.180 A specific intent standard is more appropriate
because a speaker may not intend for a particular recipient to see what he posts
online.181
One of the main arguments against requiring specific intent is it is very
difficult to prove a defendant’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt.182 However,
while it may be difficult to prove a defendant’s intent, that does not mean the
law should punish a speaker for posting something he did not intend as a
threat. In Morissette v. United States, the Supreme Court stressed that
“wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”183 If a speaker is posting rap
lyrics others perceive as threats for instance, he may not be aware that he is
doing something wrong.
An additional argument against specific intent is that specific intent
would overprotect threats that have little to no value or that the law should
hold a person who commits a wrongful act accountable regardless of whether
or not he intended to do it.184 However, these arguments fail to recognize the
possibility that innocent conduct may be punished. The recklessness standard
may be overbroad or vague and punish more speech than necessary or not give
individuals the opportunity to understand what behavior the government may

176. Id.
177. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (holding that the city
regulations on volume at a concert were constitutional as they were valid content-neutral
regulations and they were narrowly tailored to the city’s interest in “protecting its citizens
from unwelcome noise”).
178. Brief for the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, The
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment, Cartoonists Rights Network International,
and Chris Dickey as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2001, 7-15 (2015) (No. 13-983), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supr
eme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-983_pet_amcu_tj-etal.authcheckdam.pdf, at 6 (citing
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Nat’l Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998)).
179. Id. at 15.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13
-983_resp_amcu_cjlf.authcheckdam.pdf, at *8 (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 387
(2008) (Breyer, J. dissenting)).
183. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
184. Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 51, 54 (2015).
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punish.185 For these reasons, as the Supreme Court noted in Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, a law that is overbroad or vague may run afoul of the First
Amendment and accordingly is unconstitutional. 186 In this instance, under the
recklessness standard, a reasonable person may not know whether the
government may punish him under 875(c) for posting rap lyrics online. The
government may punish him under 875(c) for posting rap lyrics, a form of
musical expression, which the First Amendment protects. 187

D. Determining Context
Social media has made it easier to communicate with others, and it has
created an environment where people will say things they would not say in
person.188 Approximately 70 percent of Americans regularly communicate
through social media.189 The “barriers for entry” on the Internet are low, and
it is equally easy for both speakers and listeners to have access to the
Internet.190 This means that any person can transmit a lot of information
online.191 People tend to reveal more about themselves online and act out more
than they would in face-to-face conversations.192 The Supreme Court has
recognized that individuals have an increased availability to the Internet. 193
Moreover, individuals with internet access can communicate and retrieve
information utilizing a wide array of methods.194 Due to the increased amount
of online users and people sharing more things online than before, there will
likely be more instances of perceived threats online. This poses challenges
because without context, it is difficult to understand what a speaker means
when he or she posts online.

185. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494, 498 (1982) (finding that an
ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a license to sell products “designed or marketed for
use with illegal cannabis or drugs” was not vague or overbroad). Under the vagueness
doctrine, a government regulation that does not give reasonable people the opportunity to
know what the regulation prohibits and what it allows is unconstitutional. Id. at 498.
Similarly, the overbreadth doctrine prohibits government regulations that sweep up a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 494.
186. Id. at 494.
187. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790.
188. Brief for the Student Press Law Center, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, and
Pen American Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Elonis v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 7, www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/su
preme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-983_pet_amcu_splc-etal.authcheckdam.pdf.
189. Id. at 9.
190. Id. (citing Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1666-67 (1998)).
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, CYBERPSYCHOLOGY &
BEHAVIOR 321, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2004) and Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the Internet,
PSYCHOLOGY & THE INTERNET 75, 79-81 (Jayne Gachenback ed., 2d ed. 2007)). The
Online Disinhibition Effect is the name of a phenomenon where people say more online that
they would in an ordinary conversation. Id. This phenomenon has become so prevalent,
hence a term surfaced to describe it. Id.
193. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 850 (1997).
194. Student Press Law Center, supra note 188.
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Misinterpreting online postings is a common occurrence.195 As
illustrated with Justin Carter, young people do not understand the
consequences of their online posts.196 For this reason, others may take their
posts out of context.197 Under the negligence standard and possibly even the
recklessness standard, juries may convict people like Justin Carter for sarcastic
comments like the ones he made.198 That may be especially true among
teenagers since 79 percent of teenagers in the United States post things online
without thinking about them beforehand.199 In light of these statistics, more
people like Justin Carter who post jokes that are perceived as threats will be
convicted.

IV. PROPOSAL
Due to these challenges, courts should apply a specific intent standard
for prosecuting threats under 875(c).200 Courts should adopt this standard to
ensure that the law does not punish innocent conduct while still ensuring that
the law convicts those who post actual threats. The Supreme Court left the
door open for recklessness in Elonis, however this standard has the potential
to punish innocent conduct, including speech the First Amendment protects.201
In analyzing specific intent, general intent, and recklessness, courts should
adopt a specific intent test for cases involving online threats. That test should
require a specific intent to communicate a threat. In conjunction with this
specific intent requirement, courts should analyze the defendant’s mental state
on a case-by-case basis. This would entail looking to the totality of the
circumstances202 and the context of that threatening post to determine whether
a defendant intended to communicate a threat. This section will first discuss
the proposed specific intent standard. Afterwards, it will discuss the totality of
the circumstances for case-by-case analysis and the several factors courts
should look to when assessing a speaker’s intent. Finally, this section proposes
a plan to educate online users about the dangers of posting threats online.

A. Requiring Specific Intent in Online Threat Cases
In his concurring opinion in Rogers v. United States, Justice Thurgood
Marshall said juries should convict speakers who intend to express threats to

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Multi-Country Ask.fm, supra note 112.
200. While a specific intent standard may be difficult to prove, this standard is the one
that provides individuals the most “breathing space” for speech, while still allowing juries
to convict those who intend to transmit threats. Kendrick, supra note 167.
201. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
202. The totality of circumstances standard looks to all the relevant factors as a whole.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1982) (holding that probable cause is determined by
the totality of circumstances). While no one factor is determinative, the factors when looked
at as a whole provide the basis for probable cause. Id.
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harm or kill.203 Similarly, in Watts v. United States, an 18-year-old while at a
public rally said,
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received
my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this
Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man
I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.204

After expressing these comments about President Lyndon B. Johnson,
the 18-year-old was convicted for violating a 1917 statute.205 That statute
required knowingly and willingly threatening the President of the United
States.206 The Court reversed his conviction finding that the willfulness
standard was not satisfied as the defendant did not utter the words voluntarily
with the intent to carry them out.207 This standard should extend to online
threats. An online speaker should only be punished if he posts a threat and
intends to make a threat.
In the context of online speech, it is inequitable to punish people for
posting things they did not mean to be threats. That is especially true because
a reasonable person may think an online posting is a threat when the speaker
was posting rap lyrics for instance. Since specific intent requires that a person
desire to commit an unlawful act and achieve the result, the government will
not prosecute innocent speech.208 In United States v. Cassel, the Ninth Circuit
held that “speech may be deemed unprotected by the First Amendment as a
‘true threat’ only upon proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech
as a threat.”209 Similarly, in United States v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit required
specific intent.210 Requiring specific intent makes it less likely that the
government will prosecute comments not intended as threats. Courts should
apply this standard to ensure that juries do not convict individuals who post
innocent comments online.

B. Analyzing the Totality of the Circumstances
Since specific intent is such a demanding standard, courts should rely on
the totality of the circumstances in assessing a speaker’s intent. This standard
is traditionally applied in Fourth Amendment cases and entails looking to all
the surrounding factors.211 No one factor is determinative; all factors must be
looked at as a whole.212 This will make it more likely that the government will
convict those individuals who intend to threaten and allow innocent conduct
to go unpunished. When looking at the totality of the circumstances, juries and
courts should consider several factors. These factors include: (1) the context
203. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 43-48 (1975).
204. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J. concurring).
205. Id. at 705.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 707.
208. U.S. v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995).
209. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633.
210. United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005).
211. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
212. Id.
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of the threat; (2) whether the threat was directed at a person or group of people;
(3) the social media history of the speaker; and (4) the overall specificity or
vagueness of the threat.
As for the first factor, when looking to the context of the threat, the fact
finder should determine whether the online posting was actually a threat. If it
is determined that the threat is actually a rap lyric, hyperbole or a joke, the
intent standard is not satisfied. Elonis said his posts were rap lyrics. 213 The
First Amendment protects rap lyrics as they are a form of artistic expression. 214
Juries and judges should determine the context of the online postings so that
people do not get punished for posting “rap lyrics” or other innocent postings,
even when those postings are unpopular. They can look to the post itself and
the circumstances surrounding the post, for instance whether the online user
has posted rap lyrics before. To avoid prosecuting protected speech under
875(c), fact-finders should look to the context of the online posting as a whole.
That would require a trier of fact to consider the post’s actual meaning and
determining whether that meaning could be interpreted in an innocent way.
The second factor involves determining whether the speaker directs the
threat at a specific person or group of people. If a speaker directs a post to a
person or a group of people, it is more likely a serious threat than a post that
is not directed at anyone. Elonis mentioned his wife in his Facebook posts. 215
He did not “tag”216 her in the posts, and he was not even “friends” with her on
Facebook.217 Rather, his wife saw the posts because other people warned her
about them.218 Considerations like these make it less probable that the speaker
intends his or her posts as threats because a threat is more likely to be
legitimate if it is directed at a person or a group. If Elonis directed the posts at
his wife or “tagged” her in them, that would be a stronger case for intent.
Similarly, the relationship between the speaker and the person “tagged” or
mentioned in the threatening posting is important. For instance, if the speaker
“tags” a celebrity, the threat is less likely to be credible than if the speaker
threatens an ex-spouse.

213. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
214. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790.
215. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
216. Tagging a person on Facebook alerts that person that they were mentioned in a
post. Facebook, How Tagging Works, www.facebook.com/about/tagging (last visited Nov.
14, 2015). Any Facebook user (depending on his or her security settings) may be tagged in
a Facebook post. Id. There are several reasons to tag a person. Id. One reason is alerting a
person that they were in a picture that you posted. Id. Another reason is to alert a person
about a post you made about them. Id. A user can also tag a person in a post made by another
person or page. Id. The person being tagged in a post has the option of removing a tag. Id.
217. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005. A person who is not friends with the speaker on
Facebook will not be able to directly see the content that the speaker posts. Facebook,
Finding Friends and Users that You May Know, www.facebook.com/help/4338940099846
45/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2015). That person may not be able to see the speaker’s posts unless
he or she looks up the speaker’s page. Id. Depending on the speaker’s privacy settings a
person who is not friends with him or her may not be able to see the content that the speaker
posts. Id.
218. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015.
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The third factor involves looking at the speaker’s social media history. 219
A trier of fact can look to the speaker’s other online postings to determine
intent. Analyzing social media will involve looking at the speaker’s posts on
all their social media accounts. More and more people are on social media, 220
making it a major forum for speech. Looking to the speaker’s postings on all
their social media accounts will help shine a light on the speaker’s mindset.
Some people use their social media accounts to share their emotions.
Frequently, people share negative emotions and experiences. 221 A jury should
take into consideration whether an individual is “venting” in an online posting.
Some people may impulsively post something online that they may regret
later. That is especially true among teenagers; they tend to post things online
without fully thinking about the consequences.222 YouGov conducted a study
in which 79 percent of teenagers said they seldom regret what they post
online.223 These considerations should be taken into account.
The final factor is the overall specificity or vagueness of the threat. If a
threat is specific, it is more likely that the speaker intended the threat. For
example, if a threat gives details including time, place and manner in addition
to the threat, it is more likely to be true than a threat that lacks those details. If
a posting is vague or ambiguous, it is less likely that the speaker intends it as
a threat. An online threat that provides details about committing an offense,
including the location and time may be more serious than a threat that lacks
any detail.
No single factor is determinative of a person’s intent. Moreover, the
inquiry on the speaker’s intent should not be limited to these four factors.

219. Evidence of social media history may pose admissibility challenges. How to get
social media evidence admitted to court, ABA (Nov. 2016), www.americanbar.org/publica
tions/youraba/2016/november-2016/how-to-get-social-media-evidence-admitted-to-court.h
tml. The evidence must be relevant and the value of the evidence must outweigh any
prejudice to the defendant. Id. If there is a hearsay problem, the social media history will
only be admitted if a hearsay exception exists. Id. Authentication is another problem. Id.
The party seeking to admit evidence of social media history must show that the individual
owns the account and posted the material on the account. Id.
220. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015),
www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/. Since 2005, there
has been a 7 percent increase in adult internet usage. Id.
221. Harri Jalonen, Social Media – An Arena for Venting Negative Emotions,
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGN,
(Apr. 2014) at 224, www.cmdconf.net/2014/pdf/36.pdf. This article addresses how more
and more people are using social media to convey negative emotions. People “vent” on
social media for three primary reasons: (1) they vent to feel better about themselves; (2)
they vent to help others; and (3) they vent to help consumer companies solve problems. Id.
at 225.
222. Multi-Country Ask.fm, supra note 112.
223. Id. This study was conducted on behalf of Ask.fm. Id. Ask.fm is a social
networking site in which users ask and answer questions. Our Premise is Simple…, ASKFM,
http://about.ask.fm/about/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). The social media website has a safety
center which explains online dangers that teenagers may run into when using ASK.fm.
ASKfm Teen Guide: Being Smart & Safe on ASKfm, ASKFM, http://safety.ask.fm/safetyguidelines-for-teens/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). One of the guidelines is titled “Think
before you post.” Id. It warns teenagers that their posts are public and can be seen by anyone.
Id.
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Depending on the case, other factors may come into play to help determine
the speaker’s intent. Juries should use any and all evidence that will allow
them to make inferences of intent where the facts permit. This standard should
not interfere with law enforcement officers’ ability to do their jobs. Law
enforcement officials should investigate all credible threats and prosecute
individuals who they find made an actual threat.

C. Educating Individuals About the Consequences of their
Online Postings
Society should do more to educate individuals about the consequences
of their online postings. One way to do this is for Congress to require social
media websites to warn users to be mindful about what they post online. Most
social media websites already have pages describing the importance of safety
while using their websites,224 but the message is not getting across. Many
users, particularly children and teenagers do not understand the impact of their
online postings.225 Requiring social media websites to warn users about the
consequences of their posts can protect people from making mistakes that
open them up to criminal liability. 226 One way to do this would be to require
users to watch a video informing them about the dangers that they may
encounter while using the social media website. Another way to educate others
about proper online postings would be to have periodic quizzes on social
media websites to allow users to answer questions about safety issues. To
ensure compliance with these safety measures, the website could prevent users
from accessing their accounts until they have fully completed answering the
quizzes and surveys.
Another way to combat online threats is for Congress to pass a law
requiring schools to educate children and teenagers about the dangers of what
they post online. An effective law would require schools to teach students
about the dangers of using the Internet, ideally in their computer classes.
Teachers should explain how to set privacy measures to ensure that the
students’ content is viewed by only the people they intend to view it; for

224. The social media website has a safety center which explains online dangers that
teenagers may run into when using ASK.fm. ASKfm Teen Guide: Being Smart & Safe on
ASKfm, ASKFM, http://safety.ask.fm/safety-guidelines-for-teens/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2016). One of the guidelines is titled “Think before you post.” Id. It warns teenagers that
their posts are public and can be seen by anyone. Id.; Facebook and Twitter have similar
pages. Playing it safe, FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com/safety/groups/teens/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2016); Tips for Teens, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/safety/teens (last visited
Apr. 1, 2016).
225. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reported that a study
found one in seventeen internet users under 17 years of age was harassed or threatened
online in 2000. Education World, Teaching Kids and Parents About Internet Safety, www.
educationworld.com/a_tech/tech043.shtml (2000).
226. Most teenagers and children have used social media, in fact about 90 percent of
them have been on social media. Teaching Kids to be Smart About Social Media, KIDS
HEALTH, http://kidshealth.org/parent/positive/family/social-media-smarts.html# (Aug.
2014). Additionally, about 75 percent of teenagers maintain a social media profile. Id.
Having this requirement could teach children to be mindful about cyberbullying as well.
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example, teachers can show students how to make their social media profiles
private so that only people they are connected with can see the content students
post online. Teachers should also educate children on what they should not
post online and potential consequences. For instance, students should not bully
other students or say mean things to each other. Teachers can also explain to
students that they should not threaten anyone online, even if the students mean
it as a joke. An education program like this could potentially reduce the
instance of online threats.

V.

CONCLUSION

In concluding that negligence is not enough to prosecute someone for
posting an online threat, the Supreme Court in the Elonis case held that
something more was required.227 The question remains open as to whether
recklessness will suffice to convict a person for posting an online threat. While
the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, there are several problems with
recklessness that can result in convicting innocent conduct.
This comment has provided guidance in resolving the question regarding
the mens rea required to prosecute under 875(c), which the Supreme Court left
open in Elonis v. United States.228 This comment proposes a two-part solution.
First, there should be at minimum, a specific intent requirement when
prosecuting online threats. Second, when analyzing whether an online posting
meets that requirement, courts should look to the context of the posting to
determine the speaker’s intent. This analysis involves looking at the totality of
the circumstances and the facts of the case to determine intent. Overall, social
media complicates “true threats” even more and makes it difficult to determine
whether a speaker intends to threaten. Due to these challenges, society should
do more to educate people on the dangers of what they post on social media.
Speakers should be wary of the consequences of their posts. The concern is
that posting threats, whether they are intended or not, can create panic and fear
in the people viewing them.229 Since the Supreme Court declined to address
the recklessness issue in the context of 875(c), individuals who post things
online that reasonable people perceive to be threats can accidentally open
themselves up to criminal liability. Educating social media users and
requiring specific intent for 875(c) violations will work to lessen that
possibility.

227. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
228. Id.
229. Threat Assessment: School Threats, Social Media, Texting and Rumors, NATIONAL
SCHOOL SAFETY AND SECURITY SERVICES, www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/threatassessment-threats-rumors-text-messages/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
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